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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
PROTECTION OF PERSONS IN THE EVENT OF DISASTERS AND OTHER TOPICS:
THE SIXTY-EIGHTH SESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
By Sean D. Murphy
The International Law Commission held its sixty-eighth session in Geneva from May 2 to
June 10, and from July 4 to August 12, 2016, under the chairmanship of Pedro Comissário
Afonso (Mozambique).1 Notably, the Commission completed on second reading a full set of
eighteen draft articles with commentary on the protection of persons in the event of disasters and
recommended to the United Nations General Assembly that it elaborate a convention based on
the draft articles.
Additionally, the Commission adopted on first reading a complete set of draft
conclusions, with commentary, for two topics: identification of customary international law; and
subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties. As
such, both topics might be completed by the Commission on second reading in 2018.
Progress was also made in developing draft articles on crimes against humanity; draft
guidelines on protection of the atmosphere; draft conclusions on jus cogens; and draft principles
on protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts. The Commission commenced a
debate on a proposed draft article on “limitations and exceptions” to the immunity of state
officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, but, due to insufficient time, the debate will continue
in 2017. Furthermore, an additional proposed guideline on the provisional application of treaties
was sent to the drafting committee. The Commission decided to add two new topics to its longterm work program: the settlement of international disputes to which international organizations
are parties; and succession of states in respect of state responsibility.
I. PROTECTION OF PERSONS IN THE EVENT OF DISASTERS
In 2008, the Commission commenced work on the topic of the protection of persons in
the event of disasters and thereafter was guided by eight reports submitted by the special
rapporteur, Eduardo Valencia-Ospina (Colombia).2 As a general matter, the topic seeks to set
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See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-Eighth Session, UN GAOR, 71st Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, at 2, para. 3, UN Doc. A/71/10 (Sept. 19, 2016) [hereinafter 2016 Report]. This report and other ILC
documents are available online at http://legal.un.org/ilc. In addition, UN documents are generally available online at
https://documents.un.org/prod/ods.nsf/home.xsp.
2
International Law Commission, Eighth Report on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/697 (Mar. 17, 2016) (prepared by Special Rapporteur Eduardo Valencia-Ospina). For discussion of prior
1

forth relevant principles and rules of international law applicable with respect to a disaster,
defined as “a calamitous event or series of events resulting in widespread loss of life, great
human suffering and distress, mass displacement, or large-scale material or environmental
damage, thereby seriously disrupting the functioning of society.”3
During the sixty-eighth session, the Commission completed on second reading a full set
of eighteen draft articles, with commentaries, on this topic.4 To accompany the draft articles, the
Commission adopted a preamble, containing a final clause that sets the tone for the draft articles
by stressing the sovereignty of states, but at the same time reaffirming that with such sovereignty
comes the “the primary role of the State affected by a disaster in providing disaster relief
assistance.”5 The draft articles then proceed to identify various duties for such states and for
those entities in a position to assist them.
The preamble notes the role of the General Assembly in encouraging the progressive
development of international law and its codification in relation to disasters. The Commission’s
commentary to that clause indicates that it “serves, at the outset, to highlight the fact that the
draft articles contain elements of both progressive development and codification of international
law.”6 Thereafter, however, the commentary does not distinguish between those elements that
are progressive development and those that are codification, such that it remains unspecified as
to what extent the draft articles are intended to restate customary international law or, instead, to
advance the preferences of the Commission as to what the law should be.
Perhaps due to a belief that significant aspects of the draft articles represent progressive
development of the law, the Commission recommended, in accordance with Article 23 of its
Statute,7 that the General Assembly elaborate a convention on the basis of the draft articles.8
Whether the General Assembly will do so depends on many factors, including whether states
(particularly states typically involved in transnational relief operations) are willing to assume or
acknowledge the “duties” set forth in the draft articles. The written and oral comments received
by the Commission from states based on the outcome of the first reading of the draft articles

work on these draft articles, see Sean D. Murphy, The Expulsion of Aliens and Other Topics: The Sixty-Fourth
Session of the International Law Commission, 107 AJIL 164, 168–69 (2013) [hereinafter Murphy, Sixty-Fourth
Session]; Sean D. Murphy, Immunity Ratione Personae of Foreign Government Officials and Other Topics: The
Sixty-Fifth Session of the International Law Commission, 108 AJIL 41, 51–52 (2014) [hereinafter Murphy, SixtyFifth Session]; Sean D. Murphy, The Expulsion of Aliens (Revisited) and Other Topics: The Sixty-Sixth Session of
the International Law Commission, 109 AJIL 125, 132–35 (2015) [hereinafter Murphy, Sixty-Sixth Session]; Sean D.
Murphy, Identification of Customary International Law and Other Topics: The Sixty-Seventh Session of the
International Law Commission, 109 AJIL 822, 843–44 (2015) [hereinafter Murphy, Sixty-Seventh Session].
3
2016 Report, supra note 1, at 21 (draft Article 3(a)).
4
Id. at 17–73, para. 49.
5
Id. at 17, pmbl.
6
Id. at 17–18.
7
Statute of the International Law Commission, Art. 23, GA Res. 174 (II) (Nov. 21, 1947).
8
2016 Report, supra note 1, at 13, para. 46.
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suggest various important concerns, not all of which were addressed by the Commission at the
second reading.
For example, draft Article 7 on the “duty to cooperate” provides that “States shall, as
appropriate, cooperate among themselves, with the United Nations, with the components of the
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and with other assisting actors.”9 After the first reading,
many states expressed concern as to whether such a “duty to cooperate” existed under
international law. For example, Greece noted that the use of mandatory language in the form of
“shall” was not supported by state practice,10 a concern echoed by the Nordic states11 and
Austria.12 The Russian Federation maintained that the duty in the draft article was not a wellestablished principle of international law.13 The United Kingdom viewed that recourse to
“‘rights’ and ‘duties’ used in the draft articles” was at odds with the voluntary nature of the
principle of cooperation.14 Whether the Commission’s commentary ultimately helps to persuade
states to accept or acknowledge such a duty remains to be seen. The commentary to draft Article
7 relies in part on provisions concerning general interstate cooperation, such as those contained
in the UN Charter15 and in the General Assembly’s 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations,16 but
those instruments do not speak directly to disaster relief operations or to cooperation with
nonstate actors. The commentary also relies on the General Assembly’s 1991 resolution
“Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United
Nations,” but that resolution uses “should” rather than “shall” when speaking of such
cooperation.17
Likewise, draft Article 9, paragraph 1, advances a duty to reduce the risk of disasters:
“Each State shall reduce the risk of disasters by taking appropriate measures, including through
legislation and regulations, to prevent, mitigate, and prepare for disasters.”18 This language, too,
elicited negative reactions from many states who disputed that international law obliges states to
reduce the risk of disasters. For example, France,19 the Republic of Korea,20 and the United
9

Id. at 53.
UN GAOR, 67th Sess., 19th mtg. at 10, para. 58, UN Doc. A/C.6/67/SR.19 (Dec. 4, 2012).
11
UN GAOR, 67th Sess., 18th mtg. at 9, para. 53,UN Doc. A/C.6/67/SR.18 (Dec. 4, 2012).
12
Id. at 14, para. 88.
13
UN GAOR, 68th Sess., 25th mtg. at 8, para. 38, UN Doc. A/C.6/68/SR.25 (Dec. 2, 2013).
14
UN Doc. A/C.6/67/SR.19, supra note 10, para. 65.
15
UN Charter, Arts. 1(3), 55, 56.
16
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV), annex (Oct. 24, 1970).
17
Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations, GA Res.
46/182, annex, para. 5 (Dec. 19, 1991) (“The magnitude and duration of many emergencies may be beyond the
response capacity of many affected countries. International cooperation to address emergency situations and to
strengthen the response capacity of affected countries is thus of great importance. Such cooperation should be
provided in accordance with international law and national laws. Intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations working impartially and with strictly humanitarian motives should continue to make a significant
contribution in supplementing national efforts.”).
18
2016 Report, supra note 1, at 42.
19
UN GAOR, 68th Sess., 17th mtg. at 19, para. 113, UN Doc. A/C.6/68/SR.17 (Nov. 8, 2013).
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3

States21 all said that there is no general obligation under international law to take measures to
prevent, mitigate, and prepare for disasters, while Austria even asserted that this issue exceeded
the Commission’s mandate for work on this topic.22 Still other states, such as Australia23 and
South Africa,24 expressed concerns as to whether states had the capacity or resources to take such
measures, leading the Russian Federation to propose that a qualifier of “within their capacity” be
added.25 The Russian Federation also proposed that this draft article be framed instead as a
recommendation,26 but the Commission chose not to do so.
Draft Article 10, paragraph 1, provides that the “affected State has the duty to ensure the
protection of persons and provision of disaster relief assistance in its territory, or in territory
under its jurisdiction or control.”27 The Commission’s commentary asserts that this “duty” is
premised on “the core principle of sovereignty,” meaning that the state’s entitlement to
sovereignty carries with it certain obligations to persons within its territory.28 The commentary
notes that the “Commission considered that the term ‘duty’ was more appropriate than the term
‘responsibility,’ which could be misunderstood given its use in other contexts.”29 In this regard,
it should be noted that the Commission had previously decided that the “responsibility to
protect” (R2P) concept did not apply in the context of disaster relief.30 Yet, even so, not all states
appear to agree that even such a “duty” exists; Russia maintained that, while a state has a general
responsibility to take measures to ensure the protection of persons on its territory, it did not have
a legal obligation to do so.31

20

UN GAOR, 68th Sess., 24th mtg. at 14, para. 91, UN Doc. A/C.6/68/SR.24 (Nov. 20, 2013).
UN GAOR, 68th Sess., 23d mtg. at 11, para. 48, UN Doc. A/C.6/68/SR.23 (Dec. 5, 2013); UN GAOR, 69th Sess.,
20th mtg. at 19, para. 120, UN Doc. A/C.6/69/SR.20 (Nov. 10, 2014) (referring to draft Article 11, which was
subsequently renumbered as draft Article 9).
22
UN Doc. A/C.6/68/SR.23, supra note 21, at 14, para. 63. Austria appears to have interpreted the original mandate
as focusing only on post-disaster responses and not on pre-disaster measures relating to prevention, mitigation, and
preparation.
23
Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, Comments and Observations Received from Governments and
International Organizations, at 38, UN Doc. A/CN.4/696 (Mar. 14, 2016).
24
UN Doc. A/C.6/68/SR.24, supra note 20, at 3, para. 15.
25
UN Doc. A/C.6/68/SR.25, supra note 13, at 8, para. 41 (referring to draft Article 16, which was subsequently
renumbered as draft Article 9); UN GAOR, 69th Sess., 19th mtg. at 14, para. 105, UN Doc. A/C.6/69/SR.19 (Nov.
17, 2014).
26
UN Doc. A/C.6/68/SR.25, supra note 13, at 8, para. 41; UN Doc. A/C.6/69/SR.19, supra note 25, at 14, para. 105.
27
2016 Report, supra note 1, at 50 (draft Article 10(1)).
28
Id. at 51.
29
Id. at 52.
30
See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-First Session, UN GAOR, 64th Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, at 335, para. 156, UN Doc. A/64/10 (2016) (“As regards the concept of ‘responsibility to protect,’ the
Special Rapporteur recalled the 2009 report of the Secretary-General on implementing the responsibility to protect,
which clarified that the concept did not apply to disaster response.”); id. at 338, para. 164 (“Agreement was
expressed with the Special Rapporteur’s conclusions on the non-applicability of the concept of responsibility to
protect . . . .”).
31
UN GAOR, 65th Sess., 23d mtg. at 9, para. 58, UN Doc. A/C.6/65/SR.23 (Dec. 1, 2010).
21
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Draft Article 11 asserts that “[t]o the extent that a disaster manifestly exceeds its national
response capacity, the affected State has the duty to seek assistance from, as appropriate, other
States, the United Nations, and other potential assisting actors.”32 Here, too, numerous states
rejected the idea that there was a “duty” under international law for an affected state to seek
assistance. For example, Austria,33 France,34 Indonesia,35 Malaysia,36 Russia,37 and the United
Kingdom38 all expressed the view that no such duty existed. Other states, including Austria,39
Poland,40 and Russia,41 queried as to what would be the consequences of a breach of this duty.
China suggested that the Commission avoid the term “duty,”42 and Iran suggested rephrasing the
draft article to read that the affected state “should” seek assistance.43 Even so, the text remained
essentially unchanged on second reading.44
Draft Article 13 provides in paragraph 1 that the “provision of external assistance
requires the consent of the affected State,” but paragraph 2 asserts that “[c]onsent to external
assistance shall not be withheld arbitrarily.”45 Several states, in their comments to the
Commission, rejected the idea of a legal obligation under customary international law not to
withhold consent arbitrarily.46 Other states sought additional clarification on the meaning of
“arbitrarily” and on who would determine if a state’s decision to withhold aid was arbitrary.47
Still others worried that if the consent was withheld arbitrarily, then the draft article might be
32

2016 Report, supra note 1, at 53 (draft Article 11).
UN GAOR, 66th Sess., 23d mtg. at 5, para. 23, UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.23 (Nov. 14, 2011).
34
Id. at 9, para. 38.
35
UN GAOR, 66th Sess., 24th mtg. at 13, para. 70,UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.24 (Dec. 1, 2011).
36
Id. at 20, para. 114.
37
Id. at 7, para. 37.
38
UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.23, supra note 33, at 10, para. 45.
39
UN Doc. A/CN.4/696, supra note 23, at 40–41 (referring to draft Article 13, which was subsequently renumbered
as draft Article 11).
40
UN Doc. A/C.6/67/SR.19, supra note 10, at 12, para. 73 (referring to draft Article 10, which was subsequently
renumbered as draft Article 11).
41
UN Doc. A/C.6/69/SR.19, supra note 25, at 14, para. 107.
42
UN Doc. A/C.6/69/SR.20, supra note 21, at 5, para. 25.
43
UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.24, supra note 35, at 10, para. 50; UN GAOR, 67th Sess., 20th mtg. at 3, para. 14, UN
Doc. A/C.6/67/SR.20 (Dec. 7, 2012).
44
The text at first reading provided: “To the extent that a disaster exceeds its national response capacity, the affected
State has the duty to seek assistance from among other States, the United Nations, other competent
intergovernmental organizations and relevant non-governmental organizations, as appropriate.” Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-Sixth Session, UN GAOR, 69th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 119,
UN Doc. A/69/10 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 Report].
45
2016 Report, supra note 1, at 59 (draft Article 13).
46
See, e.g., UN Doc. A/CN.4/696, supra note 23, at 43 (Australia) (referring to draft Article 14, which was
subsequently renumbered as draft Article 13); UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.23, supra note 33, at 10, para. 42 (China)
(referring to draft Article 11, which was subsequently renumbered as draft Article 13).
47
UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.23, supra note 33, at 8, para. 33 (Israel); UN GAOR, 66th Sess., 25th mtg. at 3, para. 10,
UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.25 (Dec. 9, 2011) (Argentina) (referring to draft Article 11, which was subsequently
renumbered as draft Article 13); UN Doc. A/C.6/67/SR.20, supra note 43, at 4, para. 20 (India). Other states sought
clarification as to who would decide if an arbitrary refusal of consent occurred. E.g., UN GAOR, 66th Sess., 24th
mtg. at 20, para. 118, UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR/24 (Dec. 1, 2011) (Malaysia); UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.25, supra, at 4,
para. 22 (Ireland).
33
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read as allowing other states to act without the affected state’s consent,48 or at least to pass
judgments upon the affected state.49 For such reasons, some states suggested that the draft article
in some fashion be expressed as a political or moral recommendation.50 The text, however,
remained unchanged on second reading. A further issue, unaddressed in this text, is whether
disaster assistance can be provided in circumstances where the disaster has resulted in a collapse
of the affected state’s government, such that consent is not possible.
One important question not fully resolved by the text adopted at first reading concerned
the relationship of these draft articles to other rules of international law, notably those that apply
during an armed conflict. Treaties on the law of armed conflict contain numerous provisions that
balance the rights and duties of a belligerent, in the specific situation of armed conflict, with
respect to relief activities, including consignments of medical supplies, food and clothing,
cooperation with national Red Cross and other societies, and treatment of relief personnel.51
Draft Article 18 announces in paragraph 1 that the “present draft articles are without prejudice to
other applicable rules of international law” and in paragraph 2 that they “do not apply to the
extent that the response to a disaster is governed by the rules of international humanitarian
law.”52
II. COMPLETION OF THE FIRST READING FOR TWO TOPICS
Identification of Customary International Law
At the sixty-eighth session, the Commission debated the fourth report of the special
rapporteur Michael Wood (United Kingdom) on the identification of customary international
law.53 This report proposed a few revisions to the set of sixteen draft conclusions on this topic
previously adopted by the drafting committee.54 Until this session, the work on this topic had
48

UN Doc. A/CN.4/696, supra note 23, at 40–41 (Austria); see also id. at 44 (Germany) (“We concur that although
the consent of the affected State shall not be withheld arbitrarily, consent is nevertheless an indispensable
requirement for every provision of external assistance.”) (referring to draft Article 14, which was subsequently
renumbered as draft Article 13).
49
UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.24, supra note 35, at 10, para. 52 (Iran).
50
See, e.g., UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.24, supra note 35, at 7, para. 37 (Russia).
51
See, e.g., Geneva Convention [No. IV] Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Arts. 23, 55,
59–63, 109–11, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST 3516, 75 UNTS 287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Arts. 69–71, June 8, 1977,
1125 UNTS 3, 16 ILM 1391 (1977); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts, Art. 18, June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 609.
52
2016 Report, supra note 1, at 72 (draft Article 18).
53
International Law Commission, Fourth Report on Identification of Customary International Law, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/695 (Mar. 8, 2016) (prepared by Special Rapporteur Michael Wood); see also Fourth Report on
Identification of Customary International Law, Addendum, UN Doc. A/CN.4/695/Add.1 (May 25, 2016) (extensive
bibliography on the topic).
54
For discussion of prior work on these draft conclusions, see Murphy, Sixty-Fourth Session, supra note 2, at 174;
Murphy, Sixty-Fifth Session, supra note 2, at 52–53; Murphy, Sixty-Sixth Session, supra note 2, at 140–42; Murphy,
Sixty-Seventh Session, supra note 2, at 822–32.
6

remained in the drafting committee, without piecemeal adoption by the Commission of draft
conclusions with commentary. As such, the Commission’s principal work on this topic during
this session was to consider and revise the commentary proposed by Wood to the entire set of
draft conclusions, which was done first in a specially convened working group and then in the
plenary. The Commission subsequently adopted, on first reading, the draft conclusions with
commentary.55
The opening paragraphs of the commentary state:
(1)
The present draft conclusions concern the methodology for identifying rules of
customary international law. They seek to offer practical guidance on how the existence
(or non-existence) of rules of customary international law, and their content, are to be
determined. This matter is not only of concern to specialists in public international law;
others, including those involved with national courts, are increasingly called upon to
apply or advise on customary international law. Whenever doing so, a structured and
careful process of legal analysis and evaluation is required to ensure that a rule of
customary international law is properly identified, thus promoting the credibility of the
particular determination.
(2)
Customary international law remains an important source of public international
law. In the international legal system, such unwritten law, deriving from practice
accepted as law, can be an effective means for subjects of international law to regulate
their behaviour and it is indeed often invoked by States and others. Customary
international law is, moreover, among the sources of international law listed in Article 38,
paragraph 1, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which refers, in
subparagraph (b), to “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law.” This wording reflects the two constituent elements of customary international law:
a general practice and its acceptance as law (also referred to as opinio juris).
(3)
The identification of customary international law is a matter on which there is a
wealth of material, including case law and scholarly writings. The draft conclusions
reflect the approach adopted by States, as well as by international courts and tribunals
and within international organizations. Recognizing that the process for the identification
of customary international law is not always susceptible to exact formulations, they aim
to offer clear guidance without being overly prescriptive.
(4)
The 16 draft conclusions that follow are divided into seven parts. Part One deals
with scope and purpose. Part Two sets out the basic approach to the identification of
customary international law, the “two element” approach. Parts Three and Four provide
55

2016 Report, supra note 1, at 80–117.
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further guidance on the two constituent elements of customary international law, which
also serve as the criteria for its identification, “a general practice” and “acceptance as
law” (opinio juris). Part Five addresses certain categories of materials that are frequently
invoked in the identification of rules of customary international law. Parts Six and Seven
deal with two exceptional cases: the persistent objector; and particular customary
international law (being rules of customary international law that apply only among a
limited number of States).56
Having completed the first reading on this topic, the Commission will now wait for
comments from states and others, with a likely second reading in 2018.57 Those comments may
provide interesting insights into the views of states with respect to the following topics: the “twoelement” approach; the role of specially affected states; inaction as a form of state practice (and
evidence of acceptance as law); the role of international organizations, as such, when identifying
customary international law; the effects of treaties or resolutions of international organizations
when identifying customary international law; the persistent-objector rule; and particular
(regional or “special”) customary international law. In the meantime, the Commission has
“requested the Secretariat to prepare a memorandum on ways and means for making the
evidence of customary international law more readily available, which would survey the present
state of the evidence of customary international law and make suggestions for its
improvement.”58
Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties
The topic of “subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the
interpretation of treaties,” originally considered by a study group of the Commission within the
broader topic “Treaties over Time,” is now being addressed through a special rapporteur, Georg
Nolte (Germany).59 Under his guidance, the Commission has developed thirteen draft
conclusions on the use of subsequent agreements and subsequent practice as a means of treaty
interpretation, based on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).60

56

Id. at 79–80 (footnotes omitted).
For comments already received from states, see International Law Commission, Analytical Guide to the Work of
the International Law Commission, Identification of Customary International Law (Aug. 16, 2016), at
http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/1_13.shtml.
58
2016 Report, supra note 1, at 75, para. 56.
59
For discussion of prior work on this topic, see Murphy, Sixty-Fourth Session, supra note 2, at 176; Murphy, SixtyFifth Session, supra note 2, at 48–51; Murphy, Sixty-Sixth Session, supra note 2, at 136–38; Murphy, Sixty-Seventh
Session, supra note 2, at 836–38.
60
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, 8 ILM 679 (1969) [hereinafter
VCLT].
57
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At the sixty-eighth session, the Commission first focused on the adoption of what was
later numbered as draft Conclusion 13, based on a proposal in the fourth report of the special
rapporteur.61 This draft conclusion, “Pronouncements of Expert Treaty Bodies,” states:
1.
For the purposes of these draft conclusions, an expert treaty body is a body
consisting of experts serving in their personal capacity, which is established under a
treaty and is not an organ of an international organization.
2.
The relevance of a pronouncement of an expert treaty body for the interpretation
of a treaty is subject to the applicable rules of the treaty.
3.
A pronouncement of an expert treaty body may give rise to, or refer to, a
subsequent agreement or subsequent practice by parties under article 31, paragraph 3, or
other subsequent practice under article 32. Silence by a party shall not be presumed to
constitute subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3 (b), accepting an
interpretation of a treaty as expressed in a pronouncement of an expert treaty body.
4.
This draft conclusion is without prejudice to the contribution that a
pronouncement of an expert treaty body may otherwise make to the interpretation of a
treaty.62
Paragraph 3 is the core aspect of this draft conclusion. In its commentary to this
paragraph, the Commission explains:
(9)
A pronouncement of an expert treaty body cannot as such constitute subsequent
practice under article 31, paragraph 3 (b), since this provision requires a subsequent
practice of the parties that establishes their agreement regarding the interpretation of the
treaty. This has been confirmed, for example, by the reaction to a draft proposition of the
Human Rights Committee according to which its own “general body of jurisprudence,”
or the acquiescence by States to that jurisprudence, would constitute subsequent practice
under article 31, paragraph 3 (b). The proposition of the Human Rights Committee was:
“In relation to the general body of jurisprudence generated by the
Committee, it may be considered that it constitutes ‘subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding
61

2016 Report, supra note 1, at 119, para. 70 (citing International Law Commission, Fourth Report on Subsequent
Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties, at 5–36, paras. 10–94, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/694 (Mar. 7, 2016) (prepared by Special Rapporteur Georg Nolte)). The fourth report’s original proposal for
this draft conclusion was numbered draft Conclusion 12. The fourth report also proposed a draft Conclusion 13 on
“decisions of domestic courts,” which ultimately was not referred to the drafting committee.
62
Id. at 123 (draft Article 13).
9

its interpretation’ within the sense of article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, or, alternatively, the acquiescence of States parties in those
determinations constitutes such practice.”
(10) When this proposition was criticized by some States, the Committee did not
pursue its proposal and adopted its general comment No. 33 without a reference to article
31, paragraph 3 (b). This confirms that pronouncements of expert treaty bodies cannot as
such constitute subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3 (b).
(11) Pronouncements of expert treaty bodies may, however, give rise to, or refer to, a
subsequent agreement or a subsequent practice by the parties which establish their
agreement regarding the interpretation of the treaty under article 31, paragraph 3 (a) or
(b). This possibility has been recognized by States, by the Commission and also by the
International Law Association and by a significant number of authors. There is indeed no
reason why a subsequent agreement between the parties or subsequent practice that
establishes the agreement of the parties themselves regarding the interpretation of a treaty
could not arise from, or be referred to by, a pronouncement of an expert treaty body.
(12) Whereas a pronouncement of an expert treaty body can, in principle, give rise to a
subsequent agreement or a subsequent practice by the parties themselves under article 31,
paragraph 3 (a) and (b), this result is not easily achieved in practice. Most treaties that
establish expert treaty bodies at the universal level have many parties. It will often be
difficult to establish that all parties have accepted, explicitly or implicitly, that a
particular pronouncement of an expert treaty body expresses a particular interpretation of
the treaty.63
The commentary then proceeds to provide some examples illustrating this phenomenon and
emphasizes why acceptance of a treaty interpretation should not be presumed from the silence by
states parties after a pronouncement by an expert treaty body.64
Paragraph 4 of draft Conclusion 13 indicates that the draft conclusion is “without
prejudice to the contribution that a pronouncement of an expert treaty body may otherwise make
to the interpretation of a treaty.”65 The commentary explains that some members considered the
pronouncements of expert treaty bodies as a form of practice that may contribute to the
interpretation of a treaty, while others considered any such pronouncements were not “a form of
practice” in the sense of the present topic.66
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Having completed work on draft Conclusion 13, the Commission then revisited all the
draft conclusions and commentary so as to adopt them on first reading.67 The Commission now
awaits comments from states and others, with a likely second reading in 2018.
III. OTHER TOPICS ADDRESSED DURING THE SIXTY-EIGHTH SESSION
Crimes Against Humanity
The Commission commenced work on the topic of crimes against humanity in 2014,
appointing Sean D. Murphy (United States; the present author) as special rapporteur.68 The
syllabus for the topic provides that the objective is “to draft articles for what would become a
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Humanity.”69 At the sixtyseventh session, the Commission approved four draft articles with commentary.70 At the sixtyeighth session, the Commission debated the special rapporteur’s second report71 and then
referred six further draft articles—draft Articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10—to the drafting committee.
Ultimately, the Commission approved these six draft articles with commentaries.72
Draft Article 5 sets forth various measures that each state must take under its criminal
law to ensure that crimes against humanity, as such, constitute offenses, including instances
when a natural person commits, attempts to commit, assists in, or contributes to a crime against
humanity.73 The draft article also obligates states to ensure that command or superior
responsibility exists with respect to crimes against humanity,74 in terms almost identical to those
found in Rome Statute Article 28.75 Further, draft Article 5 precludes the use of any superior
orders defense or any statute of limitation and requires states to provide for appropriate penalties
commensurate with the grave nature of such crimes.76 Finally, draft Article 5 also provides that
“[s]ubject to the provisions of its national law, each State shall take measures, where appropriate,
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to establish the liability of legal persons for the offences referred to in this draft article[;] . . .
such liability of legal persons may be criminal, civil or administrative.”77
Following the same approach as many treaties addressing crimes, draft Article 6 provides
that each state must establish, in certain cases, jurisdiction over the offenses referred to in draft
Article 5.78 Those cases include situations when the crime occurs in territory under that state’s
jurisdiction, when it has been committed by one of its nationals, or when the offender is present
in territory under the state’s jurisdiction.
Draft Article 7 focuses on steps to be taken by a state when such crimes may have
occurred in its territory. It reads: “Each State shall ensure that its competent authorities proceed
to a prompt and impartial investigation whenever there is reasonable ground to believe that acts
constituting crimes against humanity have been or are being committed in any territory under its
jurisdiction.”79 As the commentary to this draft article explains,80 a comparable obligation
features in some treaties addressing crimes, such as in Article 12 of the Convention Against
Torture.81
Draft Article 8 provides for certain preliminary measures to be taken by the state in the
territory under whose jurisdiction an alleged offender is present.82 First, it calls upon the state to
“take the person into custody or take other legal measures to ensure his or her presence,” in
accordance with that state’s law, but “only for such time as is necessary to enable any criminal,
extradition, or surrender proceedings to be instituted.”83 Second, it requires the state immediately
to “make a preliminary inquiry into the facts.”84 Third, it provides that the state shall also
immediately notify the states able to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to draft Article 6 of the
measures that it has taken and indicate whether the state itself intends to exercise jurisdiction.
Doing so allows those other states to consider whether they wish to exercise jurisdiction, in
which case they might seek extradition of the alleged offender.85
Draft Article 9, entitled “Aut dedere aut judicare,” provides:
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Id. at 248 (draft Article 5(7)). This provision is modeled on Article 3(4) of the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, May 25,
2000, 2171 UNTS 227.
78
2016 Report, supra note 1, at 265–66 (draft Article 6).
79
Id. at 269 (draft Article 7).
80
Id. at 269–71.
81
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Art. 12, Dec. 10,
1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 UNTS 85 (“Each State Party shall ensure that its competent
authorities proceed to a prompt and impartial investigation, wherever there is reasonable ground to believe that an
act of torture has been committed in any territory under its jurisdiction.”).
82
2016 Report, supra note 1, at 271 (draft Article 8).
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 271–72.
12

The State in the territory under whose jurisdiction the alleged offender is present shall
submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, unless it
extradites or surrenders the person to another State or competent international criminal
tribunal. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of
any other offence of a grave nature under the law of that State.86
This language envisages the possibility of a state satisfying its aut dedere aut judicare obligation
by surrendering the alleged offender to an international criminal tribunal, such as the
International Criminal Court. In some instances, the state may be obligated to so surrender the
alleged offender, depending on the state’s legal relationship with the international criminal
tribunal; to the extent that the state has no legal obligation with respect to such a tribunal, the
state remains obligated to submit the case to its competent authorities, unless it extradites the
person to another state.87
Draft Article 10 addresses the rights of the alleged offender.88 Paragraph 1 asserts that
such persons “shall be guaranteed at all stages of the proceedings fair treatment, including a fair
trial, and full protection of his or her rights under applicable national and international law,
including human rights law.” Paragraph 2 provides that when the person is in prison, custody, or
detention by a state that is not of his or her nationality, the person is entitled to communicate
without delay with a representative of his or her state, to be visited by such a representative, and
to be informed without delay of his or her rights in this regard.
In his second report, the special rapporteur indicated that a third report on this topic could
address issues such as (1) rights and obligations applicable to the extradition of the alleged
offender; (2) rights and obligations applicable to mutual legal assistance in connection with
criminal proceedings; (3) the obligation of nonrefoulement in certain circumstances; (4) dispute
settlement and monitoring mechanisms; and (5) conflict avoidance with treaties such as the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.89
Protection of the Atmosphere
The Commission considered the third report on the protection of the atmosphere by the
special rapporteur, Shinya Murase (Japan).90 Based on that report, the Commission adopted a
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preambular paragraph as well as five new draft guidelines—draft Guidelines 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7—
with commentary.91
Draft Guideline 3 asserts that “States have the obligation to protect the atmosphere by
exercising due diligence in taking appropriate measures, in accordance with applicable rules of
international law, to prevent, reduce or control atmospheric pollution and atmospheric
degradation.”92 According to the commentary, this draft guideline is “central to the present draft
guidelines” and from it flow draft Guidelines 4, 5, and 6.93 Draft Guideline 4 indicates that
“States have the obligation to ensure that an environmental impact assessment is undertaken of
proposed activities under their jurisdiction or control which are likely to cause significant
adverse impact on the atmosphere in terms of atmospheric pollution or atmospheric
degradation.” 94 Draft Guideline 5 provides that “utilization [of the atmosphere] should be
undertaken in a sustainable manner,” noting that “[s]ustainable utilization of the atmosphere
includes the need to reconcile economic development with protection of the atmosphere.”95 Draft
Guideline 6 maintains that the “atmosphere should be utilized in an equitable and reasonable
manner, taking into account the interests of present and future generations.”96
Draft Guideline 7 relates: “Activities aimed at intentional large-scale modification of the
atmosphere should be conducted with prudence and caution, subject to any applicable rules of
international law.”97 By its terms, this guideline addresses both activities designed to use the
atmosphere for beneficial purposes, such as weather modification to improve crops, and
activities designed to improve the atmosphere itself, such as through removing carbon from the
atmosphere and sequestering it in the soil or marine environment.98 The latter type of activity,
sometimes referred to as “geo-engineering,” involves new techniques that many regard as
potentially harmful to the environment of the lithosphere.99 Given that the draft guidelines might
be viewed as authorizing such activities, the commentary to this draft guideline notes:
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(12)
A number of members remained unpersuaded that there was a need for a draft
guideline on this matter, which essentially remains controversial, and the discussion on it
was evolving, and is based on scant practice. Other members were of the view that the
draft guideline could be enhanced during second reading.100
Jus Cogens
During the sixty-seventh session, the Commission moved the topic of jus cogens onto the
current program of work and appointed Dire D. Tladi (South Africa) as special rapporteur.101 In a
first report submitted for the sixty-eighth session,102 the special rapporteur proposed three draft
conclusions, two of which were referred to the drafting committee.103
As provisionally adopted within the drafting committee, draft Conclusion 1 states: “The
present draft conclusions concern the identification and legal effects of peremptory norms of
general international law (jus cogens).”104 The special rapporteur also proposed two paragraphs
for the other draft conclusion (originally designated as draft Conclusion 3) that were sent to the
drafting committee. So far, the drafting committee has provisionally adopted just the first
paragraph of that draft conclusion (now designated as draft Conclusion 2), which provides:
A peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens) is a norm accepted
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm
of general international law having the same character.105
This language tracks the language of the second sentence of VCLT Article 53.106 The second
paragraph of this draft conclusion proposed by the special rapporteur, which has not yet been
adopted by the drafting committee, reads: “Norms of jus cogens protect the fundamental values
of the international community, are hierarchically superior to other norms of international law
Convention on Biological Diversity, Tenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, Decision X/33, Biodiversity
and Climate Change, Doc. No. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/33, para. 8(w) (2010) (citation omitted), available at
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and are universally applicable.”107 That language, which does not appear in the VCLT, elicited
conflicting views within the Commission and the drafting committee.108 According to the report
of its chair, the drafting committee next year will consider “moving paragraph 2, or a further
version thereof, into a separate draft conclusion or conclusions.”109
The special rapporteur has indicated that a second report in 2017 could be dedicated to
the rules for identifying of norms of jus cogens, including the question of the sources of jus
cogens, “that is, whether jus cogens emanate from treaty law, customary international law,
general principles of law or other sources.”110 Further, the second report “will also consider the
relationship between jus cogens and non-derogation clauses in human rights treaties.”111 A third
report in 2018 might consider the consequences of jus cogens, while a fourth report in 2019
could address miscellaneous issues.112
Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts
The Commission considered the third report on the protection of the environment in
relation to armed conflicts by the special rapporteur, Marie G. Jacobsson (Sweden).113 While her
first report focused on rules of international law that operate in relation to the environment even
in the absence of armed conflict and her second report focused on rules of international law that
apply once armed conflict breaks out, the third report addressed a mixture of rules, including
those applicable after the armed conflict ends.
The draft principles on this topic adopted to date are at differing levels of completion, and
the Commission will need to decide in 2017 how best to proceed given that the special
rapporteur is not seeking reelection to the Commission. Possibilities include appointing a new
special rapporteur or establishing a working group, as was done in 2012 on the topic of aut
dedere aut judicare.114
To date, the Commission has adopted introductory commentary and eight draft principles
with commentary on the following issues: scope (draft Principle 1); purpose (draft Principle 2);
designation of protected zones (draft Principle 5); general protection of the natural environment
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during armed conflict (draft Principle 9); application of the law of armed conflict to the natural
environment (draft Principle 10); environmental considerations when applying the principle of
proportionality and the rules on military necessity (draft Principle 11); prohibition on reprisals
(draft Principle 12); and protected zones (draft Principle 13).115
Further, the drafting committee has provisionally adopted nine additional draft principles
on measures to enhance the protection of the environment (draft Principle 4); protection of the
environment of indigenous peoples (draft Principle 6); agreements concerning the presence of
military forces in relation to armed conflict (draft Principle 7); peace operations (draft Principle
8); peace processes (draft Principle 14); post-armed conflict environmental assessments and
remedial measures (draft Principle 15); remnants of war (draft Principle 16); remnants of war at
sea (draft Principle 17); and sharing and granting access to information (draft Principle 18).
These draft principles and their commentary have not yet been adopted by the Commission.116
Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction
The Commission had before it, towards the end of the sixty-eighth session, the fifth
report on “immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction” by its second special
rapporteur for this topic, Concepción Escobar Hernández (Spain).117 This report addresses the
possibility of “limitations and exceptions” to such immunity118 and proposes a single draft
article:
Draft article 7
Crimes in respect of which immunity does not apply
1.

Immunity shall not apply in relation to the following crimes:
(a) Genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture and enforced
disappearances;
(b) Crimes of corruption;
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(c) Crimes that cause harm to persons, including death and serious injury, or to
property, when such crimes are committed in the territory of the forum State and the
State official is present in said territory at the time that such crimes are committed.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to persons who enjoy immunity ratione personae during
their term of office.
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 are without prejudice to:
(a) Any provision of a treaty that is binding on the forum State and the State of the
official, under which immunity would not be applicable;
(b) The obligation to cooperate with an international tribunal which, in each case,
requires compliance by the forum State.119
At the point when the Commission was scheduled to debate the fifth report, including this
draft article, the report was available to the Commission only in two of the six official languages
of the United Nations (Spanish and English).120 Nevertheless, and on an exceptional basis, the
debate was commenced with an introduction of the report by the special rapporteur121 in which
she explained that
although the practice was varied, it revealed a clear trend towards considering the
commission of international crimes as a bar to the application of the immunity ratione
materiae of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction. This was on the basis that:
(a) such crimes were not considered official acts, or were an exception to immunity,
owing to the serious nature of the crime; or (b) they undermined the values and principles
recognized by the international community as a whole.122
The special rapporteur’s introduction was followed by interventions of those members who
wished to speak during the sixty-eighth session, but the debate was not completed and will
continue in the sixty-ninth session, at which time the report will be available in the six official
languages of the United Nations.123
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The initial debate at the sixty-eighth session suggests that a divide may exist among the
members of the Commission as to whether the draft article reflects lex lata or even lex
ferenda.124 In the debate,
[s]ome members were critical of the report for not faithfully following the analytical
process of identification of customary international law referred to therein. Moreover, the
conclusions that were sometimes reached were often irreconcilable with certain other
assertions made in the report. In particular, concerns were expressed regarding the
treatment of the case law, which was of varied origin, the choice of which appeared
selective, the reliance in some cases on separate and dissenting opinions, as well as
reliance on [a] limited sample of national legislation, some of which it was suggested was
of limited relevance in the consideration of the topic. It was further noted that a trend
towards an exception in domestic courts, even if it existed, was not a general practice for
purposes of constituting a rule of customary international law.125
Part of the difficulty in reaching consensus also may derive from the methodology
employed when analyzing state practice in this area. In that regard, several issues arise with
respect to the methodology used in the fifth report, many of which were touched upon in the
initial part of the Commission’s debate. First, the report in several places refers to a “clear and
growing trend” towards exceptions to immunity,126 but it neither provides any empirical
assessment as to the existence of a “trend” nor indicates a time period (such as over the past ten
years) for such a trend. Indeed, the evidence marshaled in the report does not signal any
particular arc in the development of exceptions or limitations; support for the draft article is
derived indiscriminately from different time periods: the 1950 Nuremberg Principles;127 the
Eichmann trial in the 1960s;128 the 1976 U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act;129 the Barbie
trial in the 1980s;130 the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals in the 1990s;131 and the adoption of
124
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recent national legislation on international crimes.132 These various fragments of information do
not appear to establish either a “clear” or “growing” trend in the law. Moreover, some evidence
seems to suggest either the lack of a trend, for example in recent cases at the International Court
of Justice133 and before the European Court of Human Rights,134 or perhaps a countertrend in the
sense of narrowing the scope of national laws.135 Arguably, the repeated emphasis on a “trend”
in the fifth report is an implicit acknowledgment by the special rapporteur that settled law on this
issue may not support the proposed limitations and exceptions and therefore that whatever the
Commission says on this matter would fall within the realm of progressive development of the
law.
Second, the report seems to downplay the lack of consensus among states as to the
existence of limitations and exceptions as a matter of either lex lata or lex ferenda. The report
acknowledges at paragraph 20(a) that “there is no clear consensus among States as to which
questions concerning exceptions would be included in each of the two categories [lex lata or lex
ferenda].”136 Yet the report then does not take account of that significant observation when
considering whether state practice and opinio juris support the existence, under present law, of a
rule on exceptions to immunity.137
Third, the report discusses138 but ultimately abandons any effort to distinguish among
certain very different situations:
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• situations where there is what the special rapporteur calls a “limitation” on immunity
(that is, the act at issue is not an “official” act and therefore the question of immunity
ratione materiae simply does not arise);
• situations where there is an “exception” to immunity (for example, the act at issue is
official, but is so heinous that immunity is denied); and
• situations where immunity is being denied based on some other theory (for example, to
help ensure compensation for victims).
Instead, all these situations are grouped together, making it difficult to know the ground on
which the components of draft Article 7 are based. For example, the best justification for the
absence of immunity for the crime of corruption may be that a corrupt act, by its nature, is for
private gain and hence not an official act, and therefore the issue of immunity does not arise. If
so, grouping a corrupt act with other kinds of acts may create confusion, rather than clarity.
Fourth, the report finds great relevance in precedents arising in the area of immunity of
states from civil jurisdiction whenever they support the proposed draft Article 7139 but seems to
downplay such precedents when they are not helpful.140 For example, the report cites to certain
civil cases under national law that purportedly establish exceptions to immunity so as to support
a proposition that such exceptions also exist with respect to that state’s criminal law.141 But when
it comes to considering international case law, such as cases before the European Court of
Human Rights, where exceptions to immunity are rejected in the context of civil cases, those
precedents are deemed by the report to be of no great significance because they concern civil and
not criminal matters.142
Fifth, and likewise, the report leans on treaty practice when it supports proposed draft
Article 7 but sets it aside when such treaty practice is not supportive.143 For example, the report
concludes that the “territorial tort” exception that exists in treaties addressing immunity of states
from civil jurisdiction supports an analogous exception in the context of criminal jurisdiction;
such treaties include the 2004 UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their
Property144 and the 1972 European Convention on State Immunity.145 Yet if those treaties are
139
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relevant in support of an analogous exception to immunity from criminal jurisdiction, then they
presumably should be equally relevant with respect to the absence of any exception in those
treaties relating to genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture, enforced
disappearance, or corruption. In other words, if states in those treaties (and in their national laws
on immunity of states) did not include exceptions to state immunity for an allegation of
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and so on, then that, too, would appear directly
pertinent to whether any such exception exists with respect to criminal jurisdiction. Indeed, given
that the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property was adopted
in 2004 without any such exceptions of this kind, this fact does not fit within the asserted
narrative of a “trend” towards limitations and exceptions.
Perhaps more importantly, widely adhered-to treaties expressly addressing immunity for
certain categories of state officials in the context of allegations of criminal conduct also contain
no such exceptions. As the report acknowledges, treaties directly governing immunity of state
officials, such as diplomats and consular officials, “do not contain provisions contemplating any
form of exception or limitation to immunity as regards criminal jurisdiction.”146 Thus, in the
Vienna Conventions relating to diplomats and consular officials,147 which have been adhered to
by 190 and 179 states respectively, there is no exception to immunity relating to genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and so on. Yet the report does not consider the significance
of the lack of such exceptions in treaties that states, by all accounts, continue to regard as entirely
acceptable. Rather, the report downgrades these treaties as “mainly describ[ing] a model of
immunity ratione personae” though, as the report itself ultimately concedes, they also concern
immunity ratione materiae.148 Indeed, for acts performed by such a person in the exercise of his
or her diplomatic or consular functions, immunity continues to subsist even after those functions
have come to an end.
Likewise, treaties that specifically address the crime of genocide, war crimes, enforced
disappearance, and apartheid do not, at least expressly, deny immunity to state officials. The
report asserts that Article IV of the Genocide Convention “indirectly postulates the irrelevance of
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official status,”149 but many view that language as speaking only to the criminal responsibility of
the individual and not to his or her immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction.150 In any event,
the report could have noted that Article VI of the Genocide Convention limits the obligation to
prosecute alleged offenders to the state in whose territory the genocide allegedly occurred or by
an international criminal tribunal, which means that if immunity is impliedly being denied, it is
only in that narrower context. Likewise, conventions on corruption contain no provisions
expressly denying immunity to foreign government officials, though they do contain provisions
relating to the immunity of government officials within their own state.151 If there was, in fact, a
“trend” to deny immunity to state officials in foreign jurisdictions for enforced disappearance,
for example, it might have been expected that the drafters of the relatively recent International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance152—adopted in
2006—would have included a provision to that effect. Yet they did not do so.153
Implicit waiver of the immunity of a state official in such treaties is far from certain,154
but perhaps it can be found when the crime is so defined that it may only be committed by state
officials—such as in the Convention Against Torture—and every state party has an obligation to
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exercise jurisdiction over any alleged offender who turns up in its territory.155 In such
circumstances, the idea of an implied waiver may be at its strongest. Even so, it would be purely
a treaty-based exception to immunity, essentially predicated on a waiver when the official’s state
joins the treaty, and would only operate when the offender is present in the forum state. Further,
the International Court of Justice’s admonition in the ELSI case may be pertinent; the Court
stated that it was “unable to accept that an important principle of customary international law
should be held to have been tacitly dispensed with, in absence of any words [in the treaty]
making clear an intention to do so.”156 Further, if such widely adhered-to treaties in some fashion
support the exceptions indicated in draft Article 7, why are other exceptions also not suggested
by similar treaties that have attracted widespread adherence, such as treaties on sexual slavery,
child prostitution or pornography, trafficking in narcotics, attacks on diplomats, taking of
hostages, terrorist bombings, or cybercrime?
Sixth, some concern relates to the use of national legislation to support the proposed
exceptions in draft Article 7.157 As the report notes, “[N]ational laws regulating jurisdictional
immunity are very few in number,”158 which presents a problem for identifying settled law
relating to any exceptions. Further, most of these national laws relate to immunity of states, not
immunity of officials from criminal jurisdiction. Even so, as was the case with treaties on state
immunity, the report indicates that these national laws on state immunity provide for a
“territorial tort” exception, which purportedly in turn supports an analogous exception to
immunity in the context of criminal jurisdiction.. Yet, as was the case with treaties, it should be
acknowledged that these national laws on state immunity contain no exceptions for genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and so on. As previously noted, if these laws on state
immunity are relevant to the exceptions for immunity from criminal jurisdiction, then they would
also appear relevant to the exceptions that they do not contain.
Likewise, while the report appropriates the “territorial tort” exception in these national
laws on state immunity in support of an analogous exception to immunity from criminal
jurisdiction, the report does not address an important aspect of why the former exception
developed. The origins of the “territorial tort” exception to immunity from civil jurisdiction, to a
large extent, lie in the idea that it is reasonable for a foreign state to be civilly liable for insurable
risks. For example, if a state plans to equip its foreign embassy with a fleet of vehicles and
drivers, then it should take out an automobile insurance policy, so as to address any injuries
caused in the host state from the negligence of its drivers. But that explanation for the “territorial
155
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tort” exception does not easily translate into an exception to immunity for criminal behavior of
officials.159
Moreover, while the report seizes upon the “territorial tort” exception in national laws on
state immunity, it does not squarely confront that these national laws typically maintain
immunity of the state for public acts (jure imperii).160 The report acknowledges that these laws
have exceptions for state acts that are essentially commercial or private (jure gestionis)161 but
does not acknowledge the other side of the coin, which is the preservation of immunity for acts
jure imperii. If the existence of a “territorial tort” exception in such laws is relevant to immunity
of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, then the retention of immunity for public
acts, such as military activities in armed conflict,162 would seem equally relevant, a point that
was addressed in the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State case.163
The report also notes several recent national laws implementing the Rome Statute that are
important when considering whether State practice supports the exceptions to immunity found in
draft Article 7. Yet, as the fifth report notes, many of those laws are only applicable to the
surrender of persons to the International Criminal Court and are not broader in nature.164 Indeed,
the report lists just five states with broader implementing statutes.165
Seventh, the report seems to avoid the implications of fairly consistent case law at the
international level that rejects exceptions to immunity for foreign state officials.166 With respect
to the International Court of Justice, the Arrest Warrant judgment rejected such exceptions,
albeit in the context of immunity of a sitting foreign minister.167 The Jurisdictional Immunities of
the State judgment also rejected such exceptions, albeit in the context of state immunity.168 The
reasoning of those decisions would seem to cut against the idea of exceptions to immunity for
state officials based on specific crimes, especially given the Court’s emphasis on the procedural
nature of immunity, in comparison with the substantive crime alleged (even when the crime
159
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entails serious violations of human rights).169 Indeed, the Court observed in the Jurisdictional
Immunities of the State case that “customary international law does not treat a State’s entitlement
to immunity as dependent upon the gravity of the act of which it is accused or the peremptory
nature of the rule which it is alleged to have violated.”170 In the same case, the Court observed
that a logical problem arises with predicating a denial of immunity upon the gravity of the act
alleged, since, at the time the immunity is denied, no such act has yet been proven.171 Such
observations appear to be influencing civil actions against state officials at the national level.172
The Court in the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State case did not address immunity of
state officials,173 but the Court is often cautious in confining itself to the facts and law before it.
The issue for the Commission concerns the implications of the Court’s judgment, which seem to
run contrary to the proposed draft Article 7. Likewise, the European Court of Human Rights has
systematically rejected such exceptions, albeit in the context of civil actions brought on the basis
of a right of access to a court. These decisions were not unanimous,174 and they did not concern
criminal prosecutions, but they, too, seem to run contrary to the proposed draft Article 7.
The report relies in part on the Blaškić case,175 which was decided in 1997, relatively
early in the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), and which addressed the ability of the ICTY to subpoena state officials, not the ability
of a state to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign state official. In fact, international criminal
tribunals do not seem to have taken a position that exceptions to immunity exist in national
courts, other than for the purpose of cooperation with the court or tribunal itself.176 Indeed, such
tribunals seem to recognize the difference between the two, sometimes noting that “national
169
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authorities might use prosecutions to unduly impede or limit a foreign state’s ability to engage in
international action,” whereas such a risk “does not arise with international courts and tribunals,
which are ‘totally independent of states and subject to strict rules of impartiality.’”177
Eighth, the report provides a detailed but ultimately questionable assessment of what is
happening in the case law at the national level,178 at least if the conclusion is that a “majority
trend is to accept the existence of certain limitations and exceptions to [immunity ratione
materiae].”179 One problem, as previously noted, is that there is no demonstration of a “trend”
from one point in time to another. A second problem is that the analysis tends to obscure the
number of cases at issue. The report appears to identify just eleven cases over the past fifty years
where a national court denied immunity ratione materiae to a foreign state official in a criminal
case involving the alleged commission of an international crime.180 Of those eleven cases, nine
were in Europe, one in Israel, and one in Chile. Such evidence is neither “widespread” nor
“representative,” if the objective is to identify existing customary international law.181 Similarly,
the report mentions just three cases where a national court purportedly denied immunity ratione
materiae to a foreign state official in a criminal case involving alleged corruption.182 Of those
177
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cases, two were in Europe and one in Chile. Given that a comparable number of national court
cases deny immunity ratione materiae to a foreign state official in a criminal case relating to
terrorism or sabotage—three in total183—then, on this methodology, the crime of terrorism would
seem to warrant its own exception in draft Article 7. A third problem is that several cases cited in
support of an exception for immunity ratione materiae actually involved no prosecution of a
state official, such Germany’s In re Hussein case,184 or were set aside by a higher court, such as
the Netherlands’ Bouterse case.185 A final problem is the assertion that only a “small number of
cases” have granted immunity ratione materiae for alleged serious international crimes, when
many such cases seem to exist, especially if one looks at both criminal and civil cases.186
In any event, what may get lost in the discussion is the report’s own recognition that case
law on immunity ratione materiae is “less uniform” than case law on immunity ratione
personae,187 meaning that some cases involving immunity ratione materiae uphold immunity,
while other cases do not. Indeed, the report itself points out that “there are very few national
court decisions in which immunity was withheld in connection with the commission of any of
the established international crimes.”188 Further, when the cases are broken down into the
different categories of crimes—cases withholding immunity ratione materiae for genocide, cases
withholding such immunity for crimes against humanity, and so on—the numbers look even
more sparse.
Finally, though perhaps an insurmountable problem, a thorough methodology would not
look solely at cases that have worked their way into the national court system but would also
examine whether and why national prosecutors have not pursued prosecutions in the first place.
Situations where such prosecutors do not pursue a criminal case due to a belief of immunity,
which may occur with considerable frequency, simply do not turn up by analyzing the case law.
The debate at the sixty-ninth session may ultimately lead to the adoption by the
Commission of a draft article for this topic on limitations and exceptions; if so, such a draft
article likely will reflect an effort at progressive development of the law. The special rapporteur
has indicated a desire to submit a sixth report at that session on procedural aspects of immunity
of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction,189 which may assist in addressing concerns
proceedings,” along with a fragmentary reference to a U.S. case. Id. at 90, para. 230 n.352. The U.S. case, best cited
as Doe I v. Li Qui, 349 F.Supp.2d 1258 (N.D. Cal. 2004), is neither a corruption case nor a criminal law case.
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about opening the door to politically motivated investigations and prosecutions of foreign state
officials.
Provisional Application of Treaties
The Commission considered the fourth report on the provisional application of treaties by
the special rapporteur, Juan Manuel Gómez-Robledo (Mexico), which proposed one further draft
guideline for this topic, draft Guideline 10, on the relationship of internal law to the provisional
application of a treaty.190 After debate in the plenary, the proposed guideline was sent to the
drafting committee,191 which already had several guidelines before it from the prior session that
had not yet been provisionally adopted.192
At present, none of the draft guidelines (with commentary) has been adopted by the
Commission. The first three draft guidelines were provisionally adopted in the drafting
committee in the sixty-seventh session.193 An additional five draft guidelines—draft Guidelines
4, 6, 7, 8, and 9—were provisionally adopted in the drafting committee during the sixty-eighth
session and state as follows:
Draft guideline 4
Form
In addition to the case where the treaty so provides, the provisional application of
a treaty or part of a treaty may be agreed through:
(a) a separate agreement; or
(b) any other means or arrangements, including a resolution adopted by an
international organization or at an intergovernmental conference.
Draft guideline 6
Commencement of provisional application
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The provisional application of a treaty or a part of a treaty, pending its entry into
force between the States or international organizations concerned, takes effect on such
date, and in accordance with such conditions and procedures, as the treaty provides or as
are otherwise agreed.
Draft guideline 7
Legal effects of provisional application
The provisional application of a treaty or a part of a treaty produces the same
legal effects as if the treaty were in force between the States or international
organizations concerned, unless the treaty provides otherwise or it is otherwise agreed.
Draft guideline 8
Responsibility for breach
The breach of an obligation arising under a treaty or a part of a treaty that is
provisionally applied entails international responsibility in accordance with the applicable
rules of international law.
Draft guideline 9
Termination upon notification of intention not to become a party
Unless the treaty otherwise provides or it is otherwise agreed, the provisional
application of a treaty or a part of a treaty with respect to a State or international
organization shall be terminated if that State or international organization notifies the
other States or international organizations between which the treaty or a part of a treaty is
being applied provisionally of its intention not to become a party to the treaty. 194
In addition, as proposed by the special rapporteur, draft Guideline 10 on “Internal law
and the observation of provisional application of all or part of a treaty,” states:
A State that has consented to undertake obligations by means of the provisional
application of all or part of a treaty may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as
justification for non-compliance with such obligations. This rule is without prejudice to
article 46 of the 1969 Vienna Convention.195
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This draft guideline has not yet been provisionally adopted by the drafting committee but will be
addressed (along with draft Guideline 5, which relates to termination of the obligation to apply a
treaty provisionally) at the next session.
When addressing draft Guideline 10, three different scenarios should be considered
concerning the relationship of internal law to an agreement to apply a treaty provisionally. The
first scenario relates to an agreement on provisional application that itself makes reference to
internal law; in such a situation, internal law is relevant for understanding the scope of the
agreement on provisional application. Such an agreement may be seen in Article 45(1) of the
Energy Charter Treaty,196 which was at issue with respect to the tribunal’s jurisdiction in the
Yukos arbitration,197 and more recently in related national proceedings.198 This scenario has no
connection to the issue of whether a state can plead its internal law so as to escape from an
international obligation; rather, it concerns the nature of the international obligation itself.
The second scenario relates an agreement on provisional application that is silent with
respect to internal law, but a state seeks to argue that its consent to the agreement was invalid
because of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude international
agreements. This scenario is analogous to the use of internal law under VCLT Article 46 to
declare invalid a treaty that is in force.199 Of course, the ability of a state to escape from an
agreement to apply a treaty provisionally by mere notification to the other parties, as permitted
under VCLT Article 25(2),200 usually makes it unnecessary for the state to invoke internal law
for this purpose. The issue may be relevant, however, if the objective is to establish that the
agreement was void ab initio, in which case no breach of the agreement could have occurred for
which reparation is due.201
The third scenario relates to an agreement on provisional application that is silent with
respect to internal law, but a state seeks to invoke its internal law as justification for its failure to
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perform its international obligations. This scenario is analogous to the use of internal law to
justify nonperformance of a treaty that is in force; in that situation, VCLT Article 27 provides
that a “party [to a treaty] may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its
failure to perform a treaty.”202 Here again, even though mere notification to the other parties
allows the state to escape from an agreement to apply the treaty provisionally, the issue may be
relevant if the objective of the state is to establish that no breach based on nonperformance under
the treaty has occurred for which reparation is due.203
IV. ILC ELECTION IN 2016 AND FUTURE WORK
The sixty-eighth session was the last session of the current quinquennium of the
Commission. A new Commission of thirty-four members will be elected by the UN General
Assembly on November 3, 2016, to serve from 2017 until 2021.
During the next quinquennium, the Commission may decide to move new topics onto its
agenda. In that regard, during the sixty-eighth session, the Commission placed two new topics on
its long-term work program (thus signaling that they might be moved to the active agenda): (1)
the settlement of international disputes to which international organizations are parties;204 and (2)
succession of states in respect of state responsibility.205
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